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Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence:

Some Ramblings

Inspired by Robertson
Thomas C. Galligan,Jr.*
Basically what is at stake in a negligence case is whether society should hold
the particular defendant before the court liable to the particular plaintiff before
the court for the particular damages suffered given the particular manner in
which those damages arose. One way for society to make this decision would
simply be to ask the relevant decision-maker: based on all you know and
feel-should this plaintiff recover from this defendant and, if so, how much?
The obvious drawback of this visceral approach is that it is arbitrary,
standardless, lacks predictive force, and doesn't look a lot like what we usually
call law. Moreover this simple, "gut" check, question does not tell us who
decides: judge, jury, or administrator?
Perhaps in an effort to avoid the pitfalls of arbitrary decision-making, we
have developed the so-called "law" of negligence. It is about that "law" which
Professor Robertson has so eloquently written.' According to this "law," the tort
of negligence (with a capital N) consists of five elements: duty, breach, causein-fact, proximate (or legal) cause, and damages. On this I believe we can all
agree. What we cannot seem to agree upon is where one element begins and
another ends. Nor can we seem to agree upon who decides what element when.
One would think such basic concepts long ago would have been settled in stone.
But they have not and attempts to set rules in stone quickly have led to
crumbling stone.
In his article, Professor Robertson notes negligence is "multifarious and
malleable." He aptly calls it "fluid." Still, Professor Robertson has made a
spirited and persuasive argument for a particular "model" of negligence. His
"Keetonian" model is what I have elsewhere' called the "traditional" approach
to negligence. Under that model, the judge decides the duty question, normally
at a broad categoric level, then the jury decides breach, cause-in-fact, proximate
(or legal) cause, and damages. Professor Robertson opines that the traditional
"Keetonian" model for deciding negligence cases more than any other approach
satisfies the following evaluative criteria: flexibility, firmness, respect, judicial
wisdom, and labor-saving. Robertson argues that the "Keetonian" model is pro-
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democratic in its allocation of critical decision making power to juries. Professor
Robertson also points out that the "Keetonian" model appropriately gives great
deference to trial court decisions. Thus, under the "Keetonian" model, some real
power is in the trenches, not just in the high command. In the pages that follow
I intend to analyze a few of the questions Robertson's typically outstanding piece
raises for me. My short piece is not so much a response to Robertson as it is a
series of ramblings inspired by Robertson. Organizationally, I will more or less
proceed to discuss the currently critical elements of negligence: duty, breach and
proximate (legal) cause.' Lastly I will discuss a procedural proposal Professor
Robertson has made in his piece.
I. DuTY
Ironically, the toughest step may well be the first: duty. As Professor
Robertson notes, duty is usually not a practical problem in litigation; he says
duty is "purely formal in the mine run of cases and presents no significant
difficulty."' Unless there is some broad per ses no duty rule, such as the no
duty to act rule or the economic harm rule, 6 one has a duty to avoid foreseeable
injury to another.
Thus, broadly put, duty is a meaningless concept in most cases. Consequently, to say that duty is an issue for the judge to decide is to give the judge
no real power. Although the judge has the power to decide whether the case is
subject to a broad, per se, no duty rule, that is about it. Of course, if there is a
broad, per se, no duty rule, then the judge may dismiss the plaintiff's claim
based on that broad rule. This is no doubt why Robertson says the statement
"defendant has no duty" is reserved "for situations controlled by rules of law of
enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases raising the
problem to dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for defendant on
the basis of the rule."7 No doubt the judge also has the power to decide that no
reasonable person could decide that defendant's (mis)conduct posed a foreseeable
risk of harm to another. But, this is only the judge's basic power to direct a
verdict;' more on this later.

3. There are significant legal issues relating to cause-to-fact, but not for us and not for now. As
Robertson notes, none of the common models of negligence differ in their treatment of cause-in-fact.
The Issues are the same under each model. So we will save those issues for another day. The same
is true of damages.
4. David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 195 (1989).
5. David P. Leonard, The Good Samaritan Rule as a Procedural Device: It is Worth Saving?,
19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 807, 808 (1986).
6. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, at J§ 5-7 and 5-9.
7. Robertson et al., supra note 4, at 161. The trial judge decides whether the case is governed
by the relevant rule.
8. This basic power is no doubt what Cardozo meant in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E.

99 (N.Y. 1928), when he said duty is an issue for the fact finder where reasonable minds could

disagree.
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Focusing for a moment on the allocation of decision-making responsibility
between trial and appellate courts, presumably the final decision to overrule or
modify one of the broad no duty rules would be a question for the appellate court
rather than the trial court.' That is, if one is serious about testing a broad no
duty rule, the appellate court is where that test takes place. However, the
relevant lawyers probably must and certainly should raise the issue initially at the
trial court level.
Moving from the broad to the specific, Robertson notes that there is a
tendency for judges to specify duty so narrowly that the judge may usurp the
jury's power to decide breach. At least it would be a usurpation under the
"Keetonian" model. Alternatively, as the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to
have done in Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University,'0 a court might decide that
because a defendant acted reasonably vis-a-vis a given risk, the defendant-owed
no duty to guard against a particular risk. As Robertson points out, a no duty
decision based on no "unreasonable risk" may essentially transform a breach
issue (reasonable care) into a duty (or no duty) issue. The most interesting
aspect of this transformation is its reallocation of decision-making power from
jury (breach) to judge (duty).
So one may analyze duty broadly or narrowly; however, another way to
examine or explain duty is in terms of "relation." One may ask: was there a
sufficient "relationship" between the plaintiff and defendant to require the
defendant to exercise reasonable care on plaintiff's behalf? This is a more
personally oriented perspective for analysis. In Hohfeldian terms, one person's
duty is correlative to another person's right." To steal a page from Aristotle
and Professor Ernest J.Weinrib, the relationship is characterized by the bipolarity
between plaintiff and defendant.' 2 In some cases, this means a real, live
personal relationship between people-the type of relationship we think of when
one says to another: "Let's talk about our relationship." For instance, while one
normally does not have an obligation to act, one may have a duty to act if there
is a special (personal) relationship between the defendant non-actor and the
victim or a special (personal) relationship between the defendant non-actor and
the person who done the plaintiff wrong, i.e., the harm causing actor him or
herself. 3 Or, in no duty to act cases, a defendant may assume a duty by
undertaking to help, thereby creating a sufficiently personal relationship with the
plaintiff.

9. Cf.Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990) (Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed over 100 years ofjurisprudence denying bystander emotional distress claims; however, both
the trial court and court of appeal had refused to follow that jurisprudence thereby foreshadowing the
supreme court's decision).
10. 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).
11. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 65 (Oceana ed. 1978).
12. See Ernest J.Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 63-66 (1995).
13. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. Mich.
J. L. Ref. 439, 449-59 (1994).
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The relational requirement may be satisfied or analyzed not in terms of real,4
personal relationships but in reference to the risk posed by defendant's conduct.'
That is, as noted at the outset of this little discussion on duty, the court might ask:
did the risk posed by defendant's conduct include a risk of foreseeable harm to this
plaintiff before the court or to the class of persons to which thisplaintiff belongs?
If so, then usually a court will decide there is a sufficient relationship between the
defendant and plaintiff to justify holding that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff.
This is what Cardozo must have meant in Paisgrafwhen he said: "[R]isk imports
relation."'" There, because pushing a man from behind did not pose a risk of
harm to a woman on the other end of a railroad platform, the Long Island Railway
owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf. Because the conduct at issue posed no risk to Helen
Palsgraf the railroad had no duty triggering relationship to Mrs. Palsgraf. This was
true despite the fact that, as the prospective passenger of a common carrier, Mrs.
Palgraf had a business "relationship" with the defendant railroad. Of course, as
noted above, if courts define risk narrowly using risk to define relation and hence
duty may turn breach questions for the jury into duty questions for the judge.
A slightly different way to think of duty is in terms of "Thou Shalt Not." So
put, the duty issue focuses on conduct, not just relation. This is, in part, how
Justice Andrews considered the matter in his Palgrafdissent.' 6 For instance,
"Thou Shalt Not" drive too fast. One's duty is to not engage in the proscribed
conduct, i.e. one's duty is not to drive too fast. According to Justice Andrews, if
one engages in the proscribed conduct and hurts another the violator owes a duty
to the victim. Relation is only involved after the fact.'7 One has a legally
sufficient relationship with those one hurts becausethe actor violated his duty not
to engage in the proscribed conduct. Importantly, one of the reasons to proscribe
the conduct is its riskiness. One might initially look at violation of statute cases as
"Thou Shalt Not"/conduct cases. If you violate the law, i.e., engage in the
statutorially proscribed conduct, you are liable. However, violation of statute cases
are not simple "Thou Shalt Not" cases.'" That is, violation of statute, in and of
itself, does not result in liability unless the plaintiff was in the class of persons the
legislature supposedly intended to protect and the class of risks was within the risks
which the legislation sought to avoid in enacting the statute. The class ofpersons
requirement adds a relational requirement and the class of risks requirement adds
a risk requirement to the conduct focus of the statute. While criminal statutes
prohibit certain conduct, their violation may not be the basis of civil liability unless
the relational overlay and the risk overlay are present.
I have gone on too long about duty. But, as you will see, I am not yet done
with the subject. Many of you readers will no doubt find that Ihave not provided

14. This is the focus from which I began my discussion of duty.
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
16. Id at 101 (Andrews, J.. dissenting).
17. Unless one views the relation as arising between one community member and the rest of the
community.
18. Arguably, there is no such thing as a simple "Thou Shalt Not" case.
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much (if any) lucent analysis. For that I do not apologize. Thatis just the way duty
is and I have not even started talking about what I call duty/risk."9
II BREACH
Turning to breach; breach is the essence of what we think of as negligence with
a small "n." N(n)egligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care. It is at
"breach" that the jury decides whether the defendant did, in fact, exercise
reasonable care. Because breach is the conceptual core of negligence it is the first

element of negligence most tort teachers teach. What constitutes reasonable care
varies with the circumstances and, traditionally, presents a question for the jury.
If reasonable care was a question of law we would have what Professor Robertson
calls a "surfeit of authorities." And we cannot realistically have a rule of law for

conduct for every hour of every day on every street comer in the state. We would
be crushed by judicial decision. Like Sampson, we would pull the temple down on
ourselves, with or without hair.
Perhaps another reason we ask juries to decide breach is because we lawyers
are ashamed to say we don't know how to explain what's reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances. Consequently, the law asks a jury to make that

decision because a jury does not have to explain itself. Professor Henderson has
opined that asking the jury to decide what's reasonable (and thereby not calling for
reasoned explanation) is one of the ways "Negligence" preserved some little respect
for itself as what we usually call law." Negligence "Law" saved face by letting

the jury decide breach. Allowing the jury to decide an issue we can't "reason"
about lets us say (pretend) negligence is "Law" just as much as obligations or
property.
Perhaps in an effort to deal with the indeterminate nature of unreasonableness;
perhaps as a reflection of the omnipresence of economic analysis, courts and
commentators have turned more and more frequently to cost/benefit or risk/utility
"formulas" to determine reasonability. The most popular of these tests is the
Learned Hand Formula. One is negligent under Judge Hand's famous formula if
the burden of avoiding an injury beforehand (B) is less than the beforehand
probability of the injury's occurrence (P)times the anticipated gravity of the injury
if it does occur (L). Algebraically put, one is negligent if B < P x L. In Professor
Robertson's paper, he sets forth the Hand formula as the appropriate vehicle for
determining breach. I slightly disagree.
First, note that while Robertson would have courts employ the Hand formula
to decide breach the formula need not be so limited. The formula can swallow up
all of the elements of negligence and, unlike Jonah, those elements need not
necessarily reappear. That is, one may have a duty to protect against only those

19. For a more coherent analysis, see Weinrib, supra note 12, at 145-70
20. James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law,
51 Ind. LJ.467 (1976).
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risks for which B < P x L. This is the import of the court's approach to duty in
Pitre v. LouisianaTech University.2' Additionally, one may only be a legal cause
of those injuries for which B < P x L. Finally, only those damages for which B <
P x L might be recoverable. If economic efficiency is the core concern of
negligence, cause-in-fact may actually be unnecessary. We can encourage
efficiency whether the person to be deterred caused any injury or not.
Moreover, if the Hand formula "replaces" the traditional elements of
negligence one key question is who decides whether B < P x L. If it is ajury issue,
then the judge will have little to do in negligence cases. If B < P x L is for judges
to decide, then the allocation of decision making responsibility will be radically
affected, by taking the breach question away from the jury. Professor Robertson
does not propose to allow the Hand formula to swallow the other elements of
negligence. Robertson views the formula as the way to make the breach determination. And, notably, Robertson entrusts the Hand formula to the jury's decisionmaking hands. However, I must still note some concern.
The Hand formula provides an economic definition of negligence. It is
designed to encourage efficient investments in safety. One must invest in safety up
to the point where the marginal benefit of the last unit (dollar) invested in safety
equals its marginal cost. If the marginal cost of an additionaf investment in safety
exceeded the marginal benefit, a rational person would not make that additional
investment in safety; she would not be getting what she paid for. But, as long as
the marginal benefit from investing in safety exceeds the marginal cost, a rational
person should keep investing in safety.
Critically, the value served by the Hand formula is economic efficiency. Ifthat
is to be the core moral basis of negligence, are juries the proper decision makers?
Are jurors likely to be able to engage in the type of cost/benefit analysis that may
be required, including consideration of such concepts as: opportunity costs,
transaction costs, risk calculations, and more? Robertson apparently assumes they
can.
More basically, when we say people must behave reasonably to avoid injury
to another, are economic values the only ones with which we are concerned? I do
not think so. 2 If I can steal a line from Joseph Campbell, there is not a lot of
economic sense to the pyramids of Egypt or the cathedrals of Europe. Maybe we
Americans at the end of the 20th Century have abandoned such lofty non-economic
goals, replacing them with temporarily profitable strip malls. I hope not.
As I have argued elsewhere, 23 reasonable people (particularly reasonable
entities) certainly may consider economic efficiency when acting, at least in some

instances.'

However, intuitively, I believe people consider other, non-economic

21. 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).
22. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.. The Tragedy in Torts, 5 Cornell J. of Law and Public Policy 139

(1996).
23. I4 at 151-52.

24. Professor Weinrib argues that deterrence (efficiency) cannot coherently explain the private law
of negligence. Weinrib, supra note 12. at 43.
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factors as well and I prefer to trust my intuition on this one. Indeed people may
even reject efficiency in certain cases. Arguably that is what the famous Ford Pinto
punitive damages case, Grimshaw v. FordMotor Co.,2 was all about.
Feminist tort scholarships and corrective justice tort theories 2" reflect
dissatisfaction with translating reasonable care into efficient investments in
safety. As such, perhaps the Hand formula should only be a factor in determining breach, not the only or defining factor.
Switching gears slightly to once again consider who decides what, the breach
"element" was, as Professor Robertson notes, a famous battlefield in the history
of tort law. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. felt that:
A judge who has long sat at nisiprius ought gradually to acquire a fund
of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the
community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury. He
should be able to lead and to instruct them in detail, even where he
thinks it desirable, on the whole, to take their opinion. Furthermore the
sphere in which he is able to rule without taking their opinion at all
should be continually growing.
It has often been said, that negligence is pure matter of fact, or that,
after the court has declared the evidence to be such that negligence may
be inferred from it, the jury are always to decide whether the inference
shall be drawn. But it is believed that the courts, when they lay down
this broad proposition, are thinking of cases where the conduct to be
passed upon is not proved directly, and the main or only question is
what that conduct was, not standard shall be applied to it after it is
established.'
As noted,2'9 Holmes believed that the judge over time would grow more experienced in applying the appropriate standard of care. The judge would then only
ask the jury to decide facts. The judge's "applications" of the standard of care
would, in essence, be legal conclusions.
Anyone who has just finished his or her first semester of torts will remember
Holmes' stop, look, listen and get out of the vehicle at a railroad grade crossing
rule. That is, when a driver came upon a grade crossing it was his obligation to
stop, look and listen. If stopping, looking, and listening were inconclusive, in
relation to the safety of continuing, the driver had a duty to get out of his truck
to check the tracks. The failure to do so was negligence, usually contributory
negligence."0

25. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
26. Leslie Bender, ALawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.Legal Educ. 3(1988).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Welnrib, supra note 12, at 3-6. 43.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 99 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
The next three paragraphs originally appeared in Galligan, supra note 2, at 41-42.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 24 (1927).
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The first year tort student will also recall that in Pokorav. Wabash Railway
Co.3' Justice Cordozo gently repudiated Holmes' "rule of law," noting that in
the vast array of grade crossing cases a rule that a truck driver had an obligation
to stop, look, listen, and possibly get out at every grade crossing was contrary
to common sense. To Cardozo, it was preferable to say that the truck driver
must exercise reasonable care when approaching a grade crossing and reasonable
care was to be decided by the fact finder on a case by case basis, not defined by
a decision in a previous case. No two cases were exactly alike. To Cardozo, the
"standard of care" question remains a mixed question of fact and law for the
jury. "Rules of law" were to be frowned upon. Thus we see two great jurists'
views on breach. Looking back most of us would say Cardozo "won'! and
Holmes "lost." Juries generally, the hornbook tells us, set and apply the standard
of care of the reasonable person under the circumstances. 2
Now, the Louisiana appellate courts have resurrected the Holmes/Cardozo
debate.3 3 In Green v. City of Thibodaux,3' Phipps v. Amtrak,35 and Dixon v.
Schweggman Giant Supermarkets, 3' several panels of the first circuit court of
appeal have held that the appellate court should review de novo, as a question
of law, a finding that a thing or conduct poses an unreasonable risk of harm. De
novo review contrasts with the more deferential manifest error standard
applicable to appellate review of fact findings and, traditionally, to mixed
questions of fact and law, like breach. Under Green and its progeny, appellate
courts review reasonableness decisions de novo as issues of law, not deferentially
as questions of fact or as mixed questions of law and fact. In an opinion by
Judge Thibodeaux, a panel of the third circuit in Migues v. City of Lake
Charles37 has now agreed with Green."
The source of these recent developments may be the concurring opinions of
Justice Lemmon 39 and Justice Ortique, 4 joined by Justice Kimball, in Ambrose
v. New Orleans Police DepartmentAmbulance Service.4 In Ambrose, the court
held that the jury was manifestly erroneous in finding the defendant "grossly

31. 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580 (1934).

32. Cf. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
33. For a pre-Green discussion of some related problems, see Galligan, supra note 2, at 40-64.
34. 671 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied. 668 So. 2d 366 (1996) ("Result is
correct.").
35. 666 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 368 (1996) ("The result is
correct.").
36. 673 So. 2d 696 (La. App. ist Cir. 1996). See also Delaune v. Medical Center of Baton
Rouge. Inc., 683 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
37. 682 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
38. 1 thank my colleague Frank Maraist for discussing the "Green" issues with me and
enlightening me. The errors that follow in my discussion of Green and its progeny are all mine.
39. Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep't Ambulance Serv.. 639 So. 2d 216, 223 (La. 1994)

(Lemmon, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Ortlque, J., concurring).
41. 639 So. 2d 216 (La. 1994).
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negligent," the applicable standard ofcare in the case.' The fact the standard was
gross negligence should not have affected the analysis because application of that
standard was a breach issue, whether the applicable standard was negligence
(reasonable person), strict liability (unreasonable risk of harm), gross negligence,
etc. However, perhaps because Louisiana courts and juries have had less
experience with gross negligence than negligence more aggressive appellate review
was justified where gross negligence was at issue but notnegligence. In any event,
the concurring judges in Ambrose agreed that the manifest error standard applied
to pure questions of fact but argued that the issue of whether the evidence was
sufficient to establish gross negligence was a legal issue subject to de novo review.
Since Ambrose the supreme court has not cleared up the confusion. It denied
writs in Green and Phipps with the respective notations: "Result is correct" and
"The result is correct." More recently in Boyle v. Boardof Superisors, LSU,43
the supreme court, in an opinion by Justice pro tem Ian Claiborne (a District Judge
sitting on the Louisiana Supreme Court as Justice pro tern) held the trial court
erroneously found a one-half inch crack in a sidewalk at LSU was unreasonably
dangerous. The court did not categorically state what was the applicable standard
of review, concluding that under either the "manifest error" standard or Green de
novo review, the trial court had erred.
In Green and its progeny the relevant courts of appeal have held that pure
factual determinations are reviewable under the deferential manifest error standard
but that the determination of reasonableness is reviewable de novo as a question of
law. As Professor Robertson has noted, these cases signal a shift of power away
from the trial court and to the appellate court. However, they also may signify a
power shift from jury to trial judge. The reason for this is quite simple. If what
constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm or unreasonable conduct is a question of
law on appeal, then logic counsels that the issue would also be a question of law for
the trial court. Essentially, breach would become a question for the judge. This is
quite a shift. It is reminiscent of what Holmes said about the trial judge developing
experience in what's reasonable and what's not. However, as I said above, Holmes
lost; at least he lost once, but now perhaps his approach is being reborn with great
vitality.
Does the jury have no role to play under this "Green" approach to breach? I
believe the jury would only decide pure questions of fact. The jury would decide
whether a driver was going over sixty-five at the time of an accident or whether the
sidewalk or curb on which plaintiff fell was cracked and the jury would apparently
decide what preventive efforts the defendant undertook. However, after the jury
made those particular factual decisions, it would be up to the judge to "add up" all
the facts to see whether they totalled breach or not.
Making breach a question of law for the judge shifts power from the jury
to the trial judge and from the trial court to the appellate court and it means

42. La. R.S. 40:1235(A)(1) (1992 and Supp. 1997).
43. 685 So. 2d. 1080 (La. 1997).
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more work for both trial and appellate judges. Let's start with the increased
work for trial judges. If juries only decide factual questions, someone has to
decide what factual questions to ask. Presumably, somebody also has to write
those questions down in a form that calls for yes or no answers, unless we opt
to give juries essay questions. Assuming the system will continue to use yes or
no answers, trial judges have to decide what to ask and then how to ask those
questions. Even if judges require lawyers to present special verdict forms,
containing requested factual questions, one can anticipate frequent disagreement
over the content, wording, and style of the questions. Trial judges will have
more work to do in drafting verdict forms. I think it would be much more work.
Why will appellate courts have more work? On appeal, courts review legal
questions de novo (anew). If "breach" is a question of law, breach determinations will be reviewed de novo. That is the holding of Green, Phipps, Dixon,
and Migues. Review de novo provides no deference to the trial court's decision.
It is a second shot at convincing another, different decision maker to hold in
one's favor. And, one gets to almost start over with the second decision maker.
At least one starts over with the "legal" conclusions to be drawn from the
relevant factual findings. Of course, the second shot is not free. There are
lawyer's fees and court costs and more. But, it is still a second shot. And, there
are all sorts of systematic costs associated with the appeal that the parties need
not pay, such as the cost to build, maintain, heat and cool the courthouse, and
the value of the time of appellate judges and their staffs spent reviewing records
in negligence cases to decide whether the trial judge or jury added up the factors
correctly. Because the parties need not bear these costs, they will not take them
into account in deciding whether to appeal. Society (you and I) will pay part of
the costs of the appellate process.
Professor Robertson has opined that the "Green," breach as law, trend is
undesirable because, although it promises uniformity, it does not provide
meaningfully uniform results. He also argues that trial courts (judges and
juries?) have a "superior vantage point" for making the "nuanced and situation
sensitive" determinations involved; a judicial legislation approach is generally
undesirable; and, quite simply, if breach decisions are for the court, why not
leave everything to the court? I believe much of Robertson's objection to Green
and its progeny arises out of his preference for having juries make most of the
critical decisions in tort cases.
I do not necessarily disagree with what Professor Robertson (I'm waffling)
says about Green and its progeny. However, whether he persuades us or not,
Green and its progeny are significant. They are significant because they
represent a revival of Holmes' views. As such, the nation should watch carefully
as Green plays itself out in Louisiana's courts. The nation should watch not
simply out of a historic or intellectual interest in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., but
rather because Green encourages us to ask ourselves: what should juries be
deciding in negligence cases? Should juries decide important policy matters
weighing on the allocation of scarce resources such as: deterrence, risk
spreading, and the economic administration of justice? Or, should juries only
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make pure factual determinations? Alternatively, might juries play some role
where what is it the heart of the case is a basic issue of common fairness?
Courts might decide broad policy matters and juries might be left to decide only
pure factual issues and basic questions of fairness. While this view is logically
appealing to the trained legal mind, it has analytical and philosophical draw
backs. For instance, where do pure questions of fairness stop and important
societal policy question begin? Moreover, what about a case where the societal
policies at stake (deterring wrongful conduct, compensating the victims of such
conduct, doing it all in compliance with legislative well and precedent and more)
conflict? What if consideration of these important social policies leaves no clear
answer? Do we then allow juries to resolve the difficult decision? Or, do we
treat the resolution of that difficult decision as a legal question for the court?
Neither legal institutions nor society have come up with clear, consistent
answers.
Perhaps, harkening back to Leon Green and Wex Malone, the idea in
negligence cases is for the court to have the first crack at decision by asking
itself: does the defendant's duty extend to protect the plaintiff against the risk
which arose in this case? That is, perhaps the court makes a preliminary legal
decision considering the relevant social policies, including fairness, in the
particular case. If the judge thinks the plaintiff should not be denied recovery,
the plaintiff can then get to the jury. If the plaintiff is entitled to proceed to the
jury, (if the court decides there is a duty in the particular case and that a
reasonable person could conclude that the duty is breached), then, perhaps, by
asking the jury whether or not the defendant exercised reasonable care or the
product or thing was reasonable or unreasonable we are opening the door to
allow the jury to consider all possible social policies (both general and case
specific) when making its breach determinations. But, we ask the jury to
consider all the possible social policies only after a court, in the first instance,
has considered those same social policies and decided that it is not inappropriate
for the jury to be allowed to make its determination.
These are grand concerns. These questions have been prevalent in American
tort law for at least the last one hundred years. While the clear answer that had
emerged in the middle of this century was that juries (or judges as fact finders)
determined reasonableness, there is growing doubt in the great state of Louisiana.
As noted, our growing doubt calls us back to the views of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. A reallocation of decision-making responsibility on questions of reasonableness
portends a radical reduction of the jury's power in tort cases. Only time will tell
whether this radical shift will come about or if we will adhere to the Cardozian
view that fact finders decide what is negligent, not courts. Whatever the answer,
the growing storm in Louisiana is certainly one more indication of the inevitable
and inherent flexibility of the torts process, where even the allocation of decision
making responsibility may vary from case to case and from court to court.
Professor Robertson aptly notes the difficulty inherent in the torts process if
lawyers don't know how judges will decide cases. That is, too much flexibility
may mean too much uncertainty. But isn't some uncertainty limited by the
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lawyers' experience with an individual judge's approach to negligence and the
ability to find out about how particular judges decide tort cases? I am not
necessarily disagreeing with Robertson but Iam not sure variety creates impossible,
unworkable inconsistency and unpredictability. Some may say negligence is a gut
check fairness decision pretending to be law. If that's true, or possibly true, the
wide variety of relevant circumstances should encourage flexible approaches.
Robertson even recognizes the possibility for breach specification as law in certain,
limited circumstances. But, he believes Green goes too far. Louisiana Supreme
Court tort watchers await further development.
It. PROXIMATE CAUSE, LEGAL CAUSE, DuTY/RISK, ETC.

Now, let us turn to the battlefield which has claimed more intellectual lives in
tort law than any other: proximate (or legal) cause. Assume the defendant (for
now) owed a duty to the plaintiff, failed to exercise reasonable care, and caused
injury to the plaintiff; shouldthelaw hold defendant liable for the particular injuries
which occurred in the particular manner in which they occurred? This is the basic
proximate cause problem and, traditionally (and in Robertson's "Keetonian"
model), it is a problem for the jury. So, how have juries made this proximate cause
decision? Judges have instructed juries to consider how direct the causal relation
between the defendant's actions and plaintiff's injuries. Judges have instructed
juries to consider how foreseeable the injuries were to defendant. Judges have
instructed juries about intervening and superseding causes. Judges telljuries about
the effects of peculiar weaknesses (i.e., thin skulls). In reviewing jury decisions,
courts analyze time, place, and policy. Quite simply, when one considers
proximate cause, one looks at all the relevant factors, including all the policies of
tort law: deterrence, compensation, risk spreading, fairness, et al."
One wonders if, in fact, all factors are relevant, then don't the things juries
look at when considering proximate cause overlap with the things they look at when
considering breach. To quote Pete Townsend: "you better; you better; you bet."
One wonders whether we need two separate elements (breach andproximate cause)
as opposed to one, especially if the jury decides both elements. Maybe it is because
law has got to have some minimum number of serious elements and if there aren't
enough elements to be respectable it's embarrassing. Again, to steal a page from
Professor Henderson, maybe the only way to get people to think there is law here
is to make it look more like law. Too few elements (articulated criteria upon which
to base decision) don't look like law. So, adding elements, even if they overlap
makes negligence look more like law, i.e. it makes negligence look more like the
mail box rule or the rule against perpetuities (pardon my common law bias).
Less cynically, even though breach and proximate cause overlap it still may be
appropriate to ask the second question-proximate cause. Asking a separate, but

44. But see Weir'ib, supra note 12, at 225, noting jury determinations undertaken in "good faith"
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related question, may impress upon the jury that just because someone failed to
exercise reasonable care does notalways mean that same someone ought to be held
liable. As such, proximate cause is a way to make sure the jury says to itself, after
deciding defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and caused injury to plaintiff,
is it fair/right/moral, etc., to hold this unreasonable person liable in this case, even
if we may have already taken at least a look at this same fairness stuff when we (the
jury) considered foreseability and other factors in deciding breach. As such,
proximate cause is a sort of check on liability after the jury decides breach and
cause-in-fact.
This gets me around to my next point and it's a biggie (for me).
Ifbreach and
proximate cause overlap, and if proximate cause is a check on a
"too" quick liability determination, then why does the jury decide both things? And
here we see the great gear shift provided by the duty/risk approach. The duty/risk
approach, as contemplated by Leon Green and Wex Malone, collapsed the duty and
proximate cause elements into a single duty/risk question: should this defendant
be liable to this plaintiff for these injuries which occurred in this manner? Before
I go on, let me pick a little bone with Robertson. Although I think recent, common
parlance may be on his side, Professor Robertson uses the term duty/risk to refer
to negligence, not a particular approach to negligence. I use duty/risk to refer to
Robertson's Model Three where "legal cause.. . [is] subsumed under the rubric of
duty and made questions of law for the judge's determination." I would prefer to
limit the term "duty/risk" to that negligence approach or model which collapses the
duty and proximate (legal) cause questions into one element for the judge.
In arguing for the "Keetonian" model, Professor Robertson eloquently notes
some drawbacks to Green's duty/risk model. Green's model transfers power from
jury to trial judge and from trial judge to appellate judge. These are some of the
same problems with Green and its progeny. However, I am not convinced that
power shift is always inappropriate.If breach and proximate cause do overlap, in
part, why have the jury decide both? That is, could it be that duty/risk provides two
"looks" at the problem by two different decision makers rather than just one? I
noted this idea above as I concluded my comments on Green.4 s Only after the
judge decides that the jury should decide the case does the jury get to decide
breach. Put thusly, only after the judge has decided that none of the relevant
policies of tort law should prevent recovery does the jury have the option of
allowing or denying recovery. One difference between Robertson's views of the
judge's role under the "Keetonian" model and the judge's role under the duty/risk
model is in how the judge looks at the policies at stake. Under duty/risk, the policy
analysis/application is not conducted just in broad categories of cases, but rather in
the particular case before the court. Under duty/risk, only after deciding that there
may be a particular duty to guard against a particular risk does the jury get the
opportunity to decide whether the defendant was negligent-i.e. whether the
plaintiff can recover. Under this model, the duty/risk question represents more of
a "check" on the jury's decision than anything else. In the spirit offlexibility, I am

45. There's even overlap in this little paper about negligence.
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not quite willing to abandon this approach to deciding negligence cases. In short,
I am not convinced consistency of approach, (by using the "Keetonian" model), is
a higher value than flexibility, especially when what we are talking about is the
allocation ofliability for unplanned, unexpected events, i.e., accidents. Perhaps it
is beat to ride easy in the harnesso when analyzing or deciding negligence cases.
IV. THE ROBERTSON PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL

Before concluding, let me point to what I see as some irony in a proposal
Professor Robertson has made in the first part of his paper. Quite appropriately,
Professor Robertson claims Louisiana law would be simpler and more internally
consistent if trial judges would grantj.n.o.v.s when a jury's finding on a relevant
issue was manifestly erroneous. This standard would apply to jury decisions on
negligence (assuming juries still decide the negligence issue after Green,etc.). The
Robertson proposal would jettison the "reasonable juror" standard now applicable
toj.n.o.v.s. That standard has no constitutional relevance in Louisiana. Instead the
manifest error standard, the standard by which factual (and thereforejury) decisions
are reviewed on appeal in Louisiana, would govern j.n.o.v.s. Presumably, under
Robertson's proposal the manifest error standard also would apply to directed
verdicts: a directed verdict would be appropriate where a finding for the nonmoving party would be manifestly erroneous.
I applaud Robertson's proposal. It is innovative, sensible, and simpler than
what we do now which, as Professor Robertson shows us in the first part of his
paper, is quite confusing. However, the proposal presumably would lead to more
directed verdicts and j.n.o.v.s because the manifest error rule is less forgiving of
juries than the "no reasonable juror" standard. As such, the trial judge would have
amore active role in negligence cases. Power would move from the jury to the trial
judge. This move is somewhat inconsistent with the "Keetonian" model which
Robertson supports; after all one of the attributes of the "Keetonian" model is its
preservation of power for the jury. However, the inconsistency is not caused by
Robertson's proposal and his adherence to the "Keetonian" model, but rather by the
manifest error rule itself and appellate review of facts thereunder. That is, because
Louisiana appellate courts review factual conclusions, Robertson's proposal, while
it increases the power of the trial judge, would make for more logical consistency.
Perhaps the Robertson proposal, as a response to appellate review of fact,
represents a procedural middle ground between Greenian duty/risk and Keetonian
proximate cause. As such, why not keep the middle ground (the Robertson
approach) and the extremes: duty/risk and legal cause? After all, negligence like
a cat has had many lives (or models) and, there's more than one way to skin a cat.
When dealing with something as amorphous as negligence, flexibility seems to me
to be a most attractive virtue.

46. See Robert Fagles, The Odyssey-Translator's Postscript 490 (1996). Fagles attributes the
riding easy in the harness phrase to Robert Frost who uttered it in reference to democracy.

